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Abstract
We use experimental data to investigate whether a decentralised approach to promoting
innovation in central African agriculture outperforms conventional extension ap-
proaches. Our main result is that this decentralised approach, based on so-called innova-
tion platforms, is effective in reducing poverty – more effective than conventional
extension approaches. However, we also document considerable heterogeneity in
terms of platform performance.
Keywords: poverty, adoption of agricultural innovations, innovation systems,
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1. Introduction
Agricultural development in Africa has resurfaced as a priority issue on the
international development agenda. In addition to obvious concerns about
food security and prices, three factors are responsible for the recent re-appraisal
of African farming: targeting, comparative advantage and inter-sectoral
linkages. Some 75 per cent of the poor in developing countries live in rural
areas, and the majority of them depend on agriculture for their livelihoods.
Given agriculture’s dominant role in the lives of the rural poor, it makes sense
to centre strategies for cutting poverty on growth in this sector (World Bank,
2007). Moreover, most African countries are agriculture-based, and tend to
have a comparative advantage in the production of primary commodities.
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Finally, agricultural growth has large multiplier effects in early stages of devel-
opment (Haggblade, Hazell and Dorosh, 2007). The growth in GDP originating
in agriculture raises incomes of the poor much more than growth originating
elsewhere in the economy (Ligon and Sadoulet, 2007), especially for the
poorest and especially in early stages of development (Christiaensen, Demery
and Kuhl, 2010).
African rural society is characterised by high transaction costs and risk, ham-
pered information flows and a weak institutional environment. As a result, both
market development and access to existing markets are inhibited. Creating an
enabling institutional and policy environment is a necessary condition for
African farming to take-off (IFPRI, 2010). Therefore, the new development
agenda emphasises (i) linking farmers to input and output markets, (ii) identify-
ing governance arrangements to strengthen property rights and asset control and
(iii) promoting technical innovation and diffusion of knowledge to increase land
and labour productivity (Djurfeld et al., 2006; World Bank, 2007; Dorward
et al., 2009; IFPRI, 2010). Increasingly it is recognised that these elements
hang together, and that innovation in the domains of governance and technology
could go hand-in-hand.
Agricultural innovation among African smallholders has progressed slowly,
and efforts to promote the adoption of new technologies, even if occasionally
successful locally, have largely proved unsuccessful. A challenging perspective
of conventional, top-down approaches to extension argues that agricultural re-
search should be embedded in a larger ‘innovation system’, integrating knowl-
edge from various actors and stakeholders. This amounts to a participatory
approach to innovation and diffusion, which implies a shift from viewing in-
novation as a ‘product to a process’ (Knickel et al., 2009). In such an innovation
system, agents such as firms, research institutes, intermediaries, customers, au-
thorities and financial organisations are interacting partners resulting in non-
linear, iterative processes (Geels, 2004; Mierlo et al., 2010).
The main objective of this study is to compare the performance of traditional
‘top-down’ approaches to innovation and extension to the performance of a
decentralised innovation system approach, and to compare both approaches
to the default case of doing nothing. Specifically, we focus on the impact of
so-called innovation platforms (IPs) on the alleviation of rural poverty and on
food consumption. We also probe potential channels explaining impact, focus-
ing on the adoption of specific technological and institutional innovations.
The question whether decentralised, local approaches to extension outper-
form centralized, top-down ones links to a broader debate that goers back to
at least Scott (1989). Scott argues that centrally managed and highly schematic
development visions do violence to complex local interdependencies, and
systematically fail to achieve their objectives. As an alternative to such ‘high-
modernist’ ideologies, based on epistemic knowledge, he proposes greater
emphasis on local, practical knowledge (which he labels ‘metis’). From a
theoretical perspective, it is not obvious which approach to innovation is
more efficient and effective – the traditional, centralised model or the local
and participatory model. Economies of scale in innovation and transfer may
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imply greater benefits for the centralised approach. In contrast, the decentralised
approach is presumably better able to capitalise on local knowledge about
constraints and possibilities, and local understanding of needs and priorities.
Local institutions, such as the ones that facilitate capitalising on local knowl-
edge, tend to co-evolve with communities, and respond to local regulatory or
cultural issues. In models explaining economic performance based on observa-
tional data, local institutions are likely to be endogenous. Careful econometric
analysis, based on propensity score matching or instrumental variable strat-
egies,1 may enable the analyst to attenuate these endogeneity concerns (even
if some concerns will remain due to unobserved heterogeneity). An alternative
approach to probe the causal impact of institutional innovations is to introduce
variation in these institutions – as part of an experiment. This is the approach
taken in this paper. Our identification strategy is based on experimental data
obtained in the Sub-Sahara African Challenge Program (SSA CP). In a
sample of villages in selected countries, IPs were introduced – forums where
local stakeholders come together and search for practical ways to advance
their livelihoods. We analyse how poverty in these IP villages compares with
outcomes in communities served by the traditional innovation approach, and
to outcomes in a sample of control villages.
Two remarks are in order. First, our data do not derive from a full-
fledged randomised control trial (RCT). The intervention villages were not ran-
domly drawn from the same sample as the control villages (but an effort was
made to ensure that the treated and control villages were ‘similar’). This has
implications for the data analysis. Second, IPs were introduced in 2008 and
2009, and follow-up data were collected in 2010. Hence, we can only pick up
short-term effects. Future work, based on additional data to be collected in
the future (in 2014), should explore whether the results we obtain are sustain-
able, or are overtaken by other events, and explore whether the channels via
which IPs have impact on poverty evolve over time.
We obtain a nuanced set of results. On average, the decentralised innovation
systems approach is better able to alleviate poverty than the traditional or con-
ventional approach (and both approaches are better than doing nothing).
However, we also document considerable heterogeneity across IPs. There are
successful IPs as well as unsuccessful ones in terms of poverty alleviation,
and it appears as if some of the platforms have failed to engage the relevant
stakeholders, or have otherwise been unable to mobilise stocks of local knowl-
edge. Unearthing the determinants of IP performance is left as an urgent priority
for future research.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly summarise key
lessons from the literature on agricultural innovations in Africa. In Section 3,
we describe the Sub-Sahara African Challenge Program, and the nature of its
main intervention – the creation of IPs in selected villages. In Sections 4 and 5,
1 For example, Mapila et al. (2011) uses propensity score matching to investigate the impact of agri-
cultural innovation systems on rural livelihoods in Malawi. They conclude innovation systems
increased the rural income, upland crop production and fertiliser use.
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we summarise our data and outline our identification strategy, respectively.
Section 6 presents the results, focusing on average poverty impacts of the
innovation system approach and on heterogeneous treatment effects (across
IPs and across individuals treated by the same platform). In Section 7, we
probe the channels linking IPs to reduced poverty and Section 8 concludes.
2. Agricultural innovations in Africa
Agricultural yields in many African countries have been declining in recent
decades. One reason for this disappointing outcome is imperfect adoption of
innovations. Agricultural innovations may be a significant growth factor for
the economy as a whole, via effects on demands for inputs and prices of food
(see the recent paper on mechanisation in US farming by Steckel and White,
2012). While various yield-increasing technologies are available for African
farmers, their uptake among smallholders remains far ,100 per cent. Key
factors identified in the literature include factors directly linked to the technol-
ogy (availability or untimely delivery of innovations, high costs, demands on
complementary inputs, ‘riskiness’), factors at the level of individual farmers
(e.g. education, access to credit, but also risk preferences and loss aversion –
see Liu, 2012) and contextual factors such as poor extension, transaction
costs (e.g. bad infrastructure), access to value chains (Barrett et al., 2012) and
geophysical conditions (for discussions, refer to Feder, Just and Zilberman,
1985; Rogers, 1995; Sunding and Zilberman, 2001; Suri, 2011). Recent
academic work emphasises the role of social learning and networks in in-
novation and diffusion processes (e.g. Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and
Udry, 2010).
Some analysts argue that an important cause of the limited impact of trad-
itional research and extension activities in Africa is the simplistic yet dominant
view on innovation processes (Leeuwis and van de Ban, 2004). According to the
traditional adoption and diffusion model (or pipe-line model, sometimes re-
ferred to as technology-transfer model, delivery model or technology-push
model) innovation is conceptualised as a linear process. It starts with conception
by scientists and extends to adoption by farmers, via extension workers (Knickel
et al., 2009). Research, transfer and adoption are independent activities,
and there is little attention for the context within which these processes are
embedded.
Consequently, traditional extension – for which various modalities exist,
including the well-known training and visit (T&V) and village agent model –
often amounted to ‘blanket recommendations’. Such recommendations might
not fit with local conditions. For example, heterogeneity in returns to new tech-
nology has recently been documented by Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2008)
for the case of fertiliser and by Suri (2011) for the case of hybrid maize. The
lack of a fit between recommended technologies and local needs may be espe-
cially pronounced when research and extension are biased towards big farmers.
Not surprisingly, then, demand for extension may be weak among food pro-
ducing smallholders in peripheral locations (Holmen, 2005). There are additional
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reasons for pessimism about the effectiveness of traditional extension. ‘Public
services have dominated extension. . . . But public financing and provision face
profound problems of incentives of civil servants for accountability to their
clients, weak political commitments to extension, extension workers not
being abreast of relevant emerging technological and other developments, a
severe lack of fiscal sustainability in many countries, and weak evidence of
impact’ (World Bank, 2007, p.173).
In fairness, the traditional approach to extension is gradually changing, shift-
ing fromthe prescriptionof technologicalpractices to focusingoncapacity build-
ing among rural people – empowering them (World Bank, 2007). Accordingly,
extension efforts now sometimes include a broader range of approaches, includ-
ing public–private partnerships (collaboration between state, firms and NGOs)
and farmer-to-farmer training. However, conventional extension in our study
region is still characterised by a single line of command, based on ‘expert
knowledge’ flowing to farmers through a network of public extension agents.
We seek to explore whether participatory approaches to innovation and diffusion
are more or less successful in reducing rural poverty in our study region.
3. Programme description: introducing innovation
systems in African farming
The SSA CP started in 2004. To remedy perceived problems with the traditional
approach to extension, a new approach was proposed named Integrated Agricul-
tural Research for Development (IAR4D). It aims to bring stakeholders together
and integrate their knowledge so as to generate network effects and stimulate
innovation relevant for the local context. The ultimate objective is to alleviate
rural poverty.
The IAR4D approach aims to promote innovations via IPs. IPs are introduced
in selected locations (serving various villages), and serve as vehicles to bring
together representatives of farmers’ associations, private firms and traders,
researchers, extension workers, NGOs and government policy-makers. Ideally,
an IP should decide on membership of stakeholder groups through a participatory
and bottom-up process. Selected stakeholders should come together, diagnose
common challenges and bottlenecks, and decide on strategies to overcome key
problems. This includes raisingawareness among localcommunities for adopting
the innovations prioritised in the actionplan – assigned IPmembers go to the field
and facilitate adoption (FARA, 2008).2 The innovation system operates at the
local level, responding to local challenges, hence, across IPs the diagnosis and
strategy setting stages may produce different outcomes. Importantly for the pur-
poses of this evaluation the intervention did not include subsidised access to
certain inputs (which would otherwise have confounded the poverty impact of
the institutional innovation).
2 However, there is always a risk that IPs might not function ideally. For instance, some stakeholders
might promote the adoption of specific innovations before other stakeholders have decided on the
bottlenecks.
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The Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa coordinated the implementa-
tion of the SSA CP, and aimed to investigate IAR4D’s effectiveness relative to
doing nothing and conventional research and extension approaches. For the
latter purpose, the implementation plan was designed as an experiment. The
objective was to obtain results informative about agricultural development
across the African continent, hence the programme was rolled out in three
major subregions (so-called project learning sites (PLS)): (i) ‘Lake Kivu’ in
Eastern and Central Africa, (ii) ‘Kano-Katsina-Maradi’ in West Africa and
(iii) Zimbabwe-Malawi-Mozambique in Southern Africa. In total, 36 IPs
were created – 12 per PLS. An IP serves multiple intervention villages (typic-
ally between 5 and 10 villages, so the number of treated villages was expected to
be between 60 and 120 villages per PLS). Per village, 10 households were ran-
domly sampled and surveyed, so the total number of households surveyed per
PLS is in the range of 600–1,200. To evaluate the performance of IAR4D
villages, data were also collected in two types of comparison villages (conven-
tional extension villages and control villages without any intervention – see
below). The total number of respondents per PLS is therefore in the range of
1,800–3,600.
How were intervention and control villages selected? The details of the sam-
pling procedure vary slightly across PLSs. For our analysis, we use data from the
Lake Kivu region, capturing parts of Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Re-
public of Congo (DRC). In each country, a sample of sites or wards was selected
(named subcounties in Uganda, secteurs in Rwanda and groupements in the
DRC). These wards represent administrative groupings of multiple villages,
and were selected to provide a representative sample in terms of market
access and agro-ecological conditions. In total, 24 wards are included in the
Lake Kivu PLS, evenly split across the three countries.
When designing the study, a trade-off had to be struck between the manage-
ment of spill-over effects (e.g. counterfactual villages benefitting from activities
or ideas generated at nearby platforms) and the balance of the sample. If treat-
ment status would be randomly assigned at the village level, then treatment and
counterfactual villages are expected to be similar at the baseline, both in terms
of observables and unobservables. But random assignment at the village level
also implies that treated villages may be located next to counterfactual villages.
To attenuate potential spill-over bias, assignment into treatment was done at
the level of the ward. This implies treated and counterfactual villages are clus-
tered in space, minimising spill-over effects – a benefit that comes at the cost of
reduced balance between treated and counterfactual villages (as will be evident
below).
Twelve wards were assigned to receive the treatment, and consequently a
random subsample of (clean) villages from these wards received an IP. We
define ‘clean villages’ as villages that did not receive any (conventional) pro-
jects in the 5 years preceding the intervention (i.e. no extension or NGO activ-
ities during the period 2003–2008). The other 12 wards were assigned to control
status, and a random sample of villages from these wards comprises our samples
of counterfactual villages. Specifically, villages from these ‘controlwards’ were
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assessed and classified into one of two types of villages: (i) clean villages that
had neither received IAR4D nor conventional projects in the previous 2–5
years and (ii) conventional extension villages, that had received projects iden-
tifying, promoting and disseminating technologies in the same period. Hence,
based on their individual history of exposure to extension, some villages
drawn from the control wards were labelled as ‘control (clean) villages’, and
others as ‘conventional (extension) control villages’.
It is important to note that the historical allocationof extension workers across
the African landscape is possibly non-random. Hence, we need to delve into
selection issues and potential endogeneities when assessing the impact of IPs.
Details of our identification strategy are discussed in Section 5.
4. Data
We use data from the Lake Kivu PLS containing villages in the DRC, Rwanda
and Uganda. For this site, 76 villages were randomly selected to be ‘treated’ by
IAR4D (i.e. received an IP). There was no non-compliance – all villages
accepted the IP (but there is variation in the nature of the intervention across
sites; see below). A village census was carried out in adjacent wards to construct
a sample frame and stratify villages into the sets of ‘(clean) control’ and ‘(con-
ventional) extension’ villages. Next, 85 villages were drawn from the set of
control villages, and another 85 villages were drawn from the set of traditional
extension villages. Note that control and conventional extension villages were
drawn from the same 12 wards, and that these wards are not the same as the ones
from which the IAR4D villages were selected.
Baseline data were collected in the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda in 2008–2009,
and the next wave of data was collected in 2010. Since some of the baseline data
are collected in late 2008 and others in early 2009, we control for the timing of
data collection via a dummy variable. Over both surveys, we observe some
2,230 households, residing in 244 villages (indicating some attrition as the
number of respondents in the baseline wave was 2,402). The average number
of respondents per village was 9.5 (standard deviation 1.6). A summary of the
sampling frame is provided in Table 1.3
Table 2 summarises our outcome variables. These include innovation proxies
(as intermediate outputs) and two poverty indicators. As poverty indicators, we
use the commonly used headcount ratio (measured at the village level) as our
primary measure, and a less-standard household-level food consumption
score (FCS). Our poverty rate estimate is not based on census income data,
3 Onereasonforattritionwasoversamplingat thebaseline.At thebaseline,weslightlyoversampled
villages and households in Rwanda. Subsequently, one village (Remera) was randomly dropped
from the analysis. Moreover, 44 households were randomly dropped from other oversampled vil-
lages as well. One other village in the DRC could not be visited because of security concerns. A rea-
son for remaining attrition is ‘relocation’ of the respondent. The analysis below is based on ,2230
households because of missing values in either the base- or endline controls. However, we have
also estimated the key models based on parsimonious specifications (fewer controls, more obser-
vations) and the results are very similar.
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but represents an estimate provided by the village leader and several other local
‘leaders’ (including school teachers etc.). During a focus group discussion,
these leaders tried to reach a consensus regarding the number of households
below the poverty line.4 Poverty was defined as per capita income below
USD 1.25. We discuss potential shortcomings of this variable in the final
section.
The FCS index is based on daily food consumption of respondents during a
short interval of time, corrected for the nutritional value of food items con-
sumed.5 It is well known that such measures may fluctuate over the seasons.
However, since our data were collected in treatment and comparison villages
simultaneously, we are able to control for such seasonal influences in our
empirical analysis.6
We distinguish between four different categories of innovation variables:
technology indicators, marketing strategies, access to village resources and
land regulations. We construct innovation indices for each category separately,
by summing the relevant binary innovation variables. Hence, following van der
Ploeg et al. (2004) and Pamuk et al. (2014), we interpret ‘innovation’ quite
broadly, encompassing technologies as well as governance arrangements, the
adoption of new regulations, changes in market participation practices or
access to new infrastructure. Unlike the adoption of techniques, we treat
Table 1. Sample design
Survey Control Conventional IAR4D (intervention) Total
Households
Baseline 806 816 780 2,402
Endline 769 776 685 2,230
Villages
Baseline 85 85 76 246
Endline 84 85 75 244
4 While we appreciate the potential concern that focus-group estimates of local poverty may be less
than perfect, we believe it is fair to say that household poverty data are typically also imperfect –
obtaining reliable income data is notoriously difficult, which is why the challenge programme
opted for the focus group methodology. Note that the focus group data are available in panel
format (for both treated and control groups) so systematic errors in measurement should not
concern us.
5 To construct this index, we used information about household consumption of certain groups of
food during the last 24h. Food groups are cereals, vitamin-rich vegetables and tubers, white tubers
and roots, dark green leafy vegetables, other vegetables, vitamin A-rich fruits and other fruits,
meat, eggs, fish, legumes, nuts and seeds, milk andmilk products, oilsand fats, sweets, spices, caf-
feine or alcoholic beverages. We score each food group based on the World Food Program Tech-
nical Guidance Sheet for Food Consumption Score (UN, 2008). Scores increase with the nutrition
level of the food group, and the index score for each household is calculated by summing group
scores.
6 Specifically, our estimates of the impact of the intervention relative to the control andconventional
extension villages will be unaffected if all types of villages respond the same way to seasonal
fluctuations.
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Table 2. Outcome (dependent) variable definitions
Variable Definition
Poverty indicators
Headcount ratio Percentage of the people living under poverty line
FCS FCS, calorie weighted average of daily consumption of a
respondent
Technology indicators
Mulching Equals 1 if a household uses mulching, 0 otherwise
Trenches/terraces Equals 1 if a household uses trenches/terraces, 0 otherwise
Water harvesting Equals 1 if a household uses water harvesting, 0 otherwise
Irrigation Equals 1 if a household uses irrigation techniques, 0 otherwise
Conservation
farming
Equals 1 if a household uses conservation farming, 0 otherwise
Animal manure Equals 1 if a household uses animal manure 0 otherwise
Cover crops Equals 1 if a household uses cover crops, 0 otherwise
Crop rotation Equals 1 if a household uses crop rotation, 0 otherwise
Inter cropping Equals 1 if a household uses inter cropping, 0 otherwise
Rhizobiainoculation Equals 1 if a household uses Rhizobiainoculation, 0 otherwise
Chemical fertiliser Equals 1 if a household uses chemical fertiliser, 0 otherwise
Row planting Equals 1 if a household uses row planting, 0 otherwise
Plant spacing Equals 1 if a household uses plant spacing, 0 otherwise
Organic pesticide Equals 1 if a household uses organic pesticide, 0 otherwise
Inorganic pesticide Equals 1 if a household uses inorganic pesticide, 0 otherwise
Drying Equals 1 if a household uses drying, 0 otherwise




Equals 1 if a household uses improved storage facilities,
0 otherwise
Pest control Equals 1 if a household uses pest control, 0 otherwise
Grading Equals 1 if a household uses grading, 0 otherwise
Land regulation
Nrmbylaws Equals 1 if the local council in the village enacted any bylaws
related with natural resource management, 0 otherwise
Landbylaws Equals 1 if there any bylaws affecting land management
in the village, 0 otherwise
Marketing strategies
Notsold Equals 1 if household did not sell at least one type of product
it produced, 0 otherwise
Consumers Equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product on farm
to consumers, 0 otherwise
Middleman Equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product on farm
to middleman, 0 otherwise
On the roadside Equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product on the
road side, 0 otherwise
Local market Equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product at the
local/village market, 0 otherwise
(continued)
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institutional or access innovations as community variables – common to all
households in the village.
Finally, our control variables are summarised in Table 3. We distinguish
between household and village characteristics. While we focus on village vari-
ables, the household variables allow us to analyse heterogeneous impact across
various dimensions, and test for potential selection bias (e.g. education, gender,
household structure and wealth, farming practice, access to credit, community
development). As mentioned, we also created a survey time dummy, capturing
whether the household was first surveyed in 2008 or 2009.
4.1 Testing for balance
Since the IAR4D and counterfactual villages were not randomly selected from the
(same) population of villages, it is imperative to check how the three groups of vil-
lages compare at the baseline. Table 4 compares control, conventional and IAR4D
villages in terms of dependent variables and (household and village) controls. The
first three columns provide subgroup averages for the various variables, and the
other three columns test whether observed differences are significant or not.
While there are no significant differences in poverty variables between con-
ventional extension and control villages nor between the IAR4D and conven-
tional extension villages, we do observe that on average the number of poor
people in IAR4D villages is higher than in control villages. Failing to account
for such pre-existing differences will bias impact assessments. In terms of
food consumption, we do not measure significant differences across the three
types of villages.
In terms of our household controls, there are hardly any differences between
the three types of villages. It appears as if the number of respondents with sec-
ondary education is somewhat smaller in IAR4D villages than in control vil-
lages and households living in IAR4D villages have more access to formal
credit. But the differences are very small and some random differences are
Table 2. (continued)
Variable Definition
District town Equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product at the district
town market, 0 otherwise
Distant market Equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product at a distant
market, 0 otherwise
Sold Equals 1 if household sold at least one type of product it produced,
0 otherwise
Village resources
Wells Equals 1 if the village have boreholes/wells, 0 otherwise
Veterinary Equals 1 if the village have cattle dips/veterinary, 0 otherwise
Woodlots Equals 1 if the village have village woodlots, 0 otherwise
Water body Equals 1 if the village have water bodies, 0 otherwise
Watering points Equals 1 if the village have livestock watering points
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Table 3. Variable definitions for control variables
Variable Definition
Household characteristics
edu_primary Equals 1 if household member having highest education level at
most have completed primary school, 0 otherwise
edu_secondary Equals 1 if household member having highest education level at
least have some vocational training and at most have completed
secondary education, 0 otherwise
edu_univer Equals 1 if household member having highest education level at
least have attended to a college and at most have completed a
university, 0 otherwise
Gender Equals 1 if household head is male
Hhsize Number of persons living in the household
Duration Number of years of experience in farming of household head
Age 15–24 Equals1 if age of the household head between 15 and 24, 0 otherwise
Age 25–34 Equals1 if age of the household head between 25 and 34, 0 otherwise
Age 35–44 Equals1 if age of the household head between 35 and 44, 0 otherwise
Age 45–54 Equals1 if age of the household head between 45 and 54, 0 otherwise
Age 55–64 Equals1 if age of the household head between 55 and 64, 0 otherwise
Age 65+ Equals1 if age of the household head is .65, 0 otherwise
Dependency Ratio of the number of household members aged ,16 and .64
to the number of members aged between 16 and 64
borrowed_formal Equals 1 if household borrowed from bank or micro or government
credit schemes credit institutions, 0 otherwise
borrowed_informal Equals 1 if household borrowed from informal savings, money
lender, NGO/Church, relatives, 0 otherwise
rooms1 Equals 1 if household lives in a house having no rooms or one room,
0 otherwise
rooms2 Equals 1 if household lives in a house having two rooms, 0 otherwise
rooms3 Equals 1 if household lives in a house having three rooms,
0 otherwise
rooms4 Equals 1 if household lives in a house having four rooms,
0 otherwise
rooms5 Equals 1 if household lives in a house having five or more rooms,
0 otherwise
survey time Equals 1 if baseline of survey is applied in 2009, 0 if it is applied
in 2008
Village characteristics
School Equals 1 if the village have schools, 0 otherwise
Hospital Equals 1 if the village have hospitals/clinic/health, 0 otherwise
Telephone Equals 1 if the village have telephones, 0 otherwise
Roads Equals 1 if the village have all-weather roads passing, 0 otherwise
Country1 Equals 1 if the village is in DRC, 0 otherwise
Country2 Equals 1 if the village is in Rwanda, 0 otherwise
Country3 Equals 1 if the village is in Uganda, 0 otherwise






/erae/article/42/1/99/496729 by guest on 24 Septem
ber 2021
not unexpected given the size of our sample. It is interesting to observe,
however, that in terms of household variables there are hardly any differences
between the conventional and control villages. We observe that, in conventional
villages, average house size is slightly larger, and the number of respondents
who completed secondary education is slightly higher than in control villages.
The situation is also similar for village characteristics. When comparing
IAR4D villages to control ones, there does not seem to be a systematic bias.
The only finding is that IAR4D villages are more likely to be connected via
Table 4. Mean values for baseline variables








Headcount ratio 43.09 51.82 56.45 8.73 13.36** 4.63
FCS 13.69 13.41 13.15 20.27 20.54 20.26
Household characteristics
Gender 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.03 0.02 20.01
Age 15–24 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00
Age 25–34 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.02
Age 35–44 0.25 0.24 0.24 20.01 20.01 0.00
Age 45–54 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.02 0.01 20.02
Age 55–64 0.15 0.13 0.15 20.02 0.00 0.01
Hhsize 6.55 6.74 6.37 0.19 20.17 20.36*
edu_secondary 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.00 20.07** 20.07**
edu_univer 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.01 20.02
Dependency 1.34 1.31 1.30 20.03** 20.04 20.01
rooms1 0.06 0.04 0.04 20.02 20.02* 0.00
rooms2 0.16 0.13 0.13 20.03 20.03 0.00
rooms3 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.00 0.02 0.02
rooms4 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.00 0.01 0.02
rooms5 0.21 0.26 0.22 0.05* 0.01 20.04
borrowed_formal 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03* 0.02
borrowed_informal 0.64 0.68 0.68 0.03 0.03 0.00
Duration 22.43 22.06 21.40 20.37 21.03 20.65
Village characteristics
School 0.48 0.44 0.47 20.04 0.00 0.03
Hospital 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.07 20.02 20.08
Telephone 0.52 0.49 0.53 20.03 0.00 0.04
Roads 0.45 0.51 0.59 0.07 0.14* 0.08
Survtime 0.29 0.29 0.20 0.00 0.09 20.09
Country1 0.35 0.35 0.26 0.00 20.09 20.09
Country2 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.00 0.05 0.05
Country3 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.00 0.04 0.04
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an all-weather road than control villages (so we control for this in the empirical
analysis below). We again do not observe any difference between conventional
and control villages in terms of observed characteristics. So, if extension
workers purposefully selected some villages and not others, it appears as if
they are not basing their selection on village characteristics.
5. Identification: average treatment effects
and heterogeneous impact
We now outline our identification strategy. We are evaluating the impact of IPs
on poverty rates and innovation proxies as intermediate outcome variables.
Note, this is not necessarily the same as evaluating the impact of IAR4D on
poverty rates. The reason is that there may be non-compliance in the sense
that not all IPs function as intended by the IAR4D philosophy. While all treat-
ment villages received their treatment (i.e. they received an IP), the level of
stakeholder engagement and bottom-up priority setting may vary from one IP
to the next. As an extension of the current analysis, one might develop an
index measuring the ‘degree of IAR4Dness’ across the platforms. This would
enable the analyst to estimate an IV model using assignment status as an instru-
mental variable for index scores, and regress poverty and adoption rates on pre-
dicted IAR4Dness. Such a strategy would yield a local average treatment effect
of IAR4D on poverty rates. The current analysis based on a comparison of
poverty rates and food security across IP villages and counterfactual villages
yields an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimator of the average treatment effect (ATE)
of receiving an IP. In what follows, and slightly abusing terminology, we also
refer to this as the ITT of receiving IAR4D treatment.
We seek to gauge impact by comparing IAR4D villages (i.e. villages benefit-
ting from an IP) and either conventional or control villages in terms of reduced
poverty. If extension workers selected the set of conventional villages
non-randomly, then failing to account for this may introduce selection bias. The lit-
erature suggests several ways to accommodate this concern (e.g. Angrist and
Pischke, 2009; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). We use (i) a difference-
in-difference (DD) methodology that combines aggregate baseline and endline
data and (ii) a first-difference (panel) methodology, where we base impact assess-
ment on intra-unit comparisons over time.
Lack of control over conventional extension activities introduces another
problem. By definition, conventional extension activities started before the
SSA CP started. Hence, conventional villages started receiving their interven-
tion before the IAR4D concept was implemented, and cumulative effort in con-
ventionalvillages could easily exceed effort in IAR4D villages. This cumulative
effectcouldconfoundsimplecomparisonsofendline data.However,exante there
is no significant difference in the headcount ratio between conventional and
control villages, according to the evidence in Table 4. This might simply reflect
that conventional approaches to innovation and diffusion have been ineffective.
Another factor may be relevant. Insofar as it takes time to gain momentum
and genuinely achieve impact, the deck is stacked against IAR4D – the
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conventional villages made a flying start at t ¼ 0, and, hence, should be able to
accomplish more during the interval from t ¼ 0 until t ¼ 1 (thus, perform super-
iorly according to the DD or panel model). In contrast, if there are diminishing
returns to intervention effort, then perhaps the ‘greenfield’ start of IAR4D
implies an advantage in a panel setting. The reverse is true in case of increasing
returns to intervention effort. These are caveats that should be borne in mind
when interpreting the empirical results, but which cannot be addressed rigorous-
ly with the data currently at our disposal.
5.1 Intention to treat effects
Define outcome variables, which are introduced in Table 2, for individual i,
living at village v at time t by Y0ivt, Y1ivt, Y2ivt for control (subscript 0), conven-
tional (subscript 1) and intervention/IAR4D treatment groups (subscript 2), re-
spectively.We will drop the i subscript for outcomevariables at the village level.
Treatment groups are denoted by Controlv, Convv and IAR4Dv for control, con-
ventional and IAR4D villages, respectively. Treatment dummies are equal to 1
if the household (or village) belongs to that group and 0 otherwise. Since villages
can only belong to one treatment group, we know
Controlv + Convv + IAR4Dv = 1. (1)
The simplest analysis rests on a comparison of endline data. Estimates are
unbiased if a classical conditional independence assumption holds
E[Yiv|Xi, Zv, IAR4Dv, Convv] = E[Yiv|Xi, Zv], (2)
where Xi refers to a vector of observed household characteristics and Zv denotes
the vector of village level characteristics. Condition (2) states that, after control-
ling for household and village characteristics, the likelihood of being in a
control, conventional extension or IAR4D village is same for all households.
If we also assume there is a linear relationship between outcome and treatment
plus other control variables, we can formulate the following regression model:
Yiv = a+ g1IAR4Dv + g2Convv + b′Xi + u′Zv + 1iv, (3)
where 1iv1 denotes an error term. In equation (3), g1 and g2 capture the ATE
of IAR4D and conventional policies on control villages. Since we aim to
assess whether IPs are more effective than conventional policies, we test
whether g1 – g2 = 0. To test g1= 0 and g1 – g2 = 0 within one model, we
reformulate (3) by using equation (1) such that
Yiv = a+ d1Controlv + d2Convv + b′Xi + u′Zv + 1iv. (4)
This gives us 2d1 ; g1 and 2d2 ; g22 g1. However, estimating equation (4)
likely produces biased estimates of impact because it is unlikely that the assump-
tion of conditional independence holds. Relaxing this assumption, we now
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introduceaDDmodel that combinesendlineandbaselinedata.With theusual con-
stant trend assumption, we obtain the following model for outcome variable, Yivt:
Yivt = a+ m endlinet + s1Controlv + s2Convv + d1(endline × Controlv)
+ d1(endlinet × Convv) + b′Xit + u′Zvt + 1ivt,
(5)
where endlinet ¼ 1 if t ¼ 1 (i.e. for the endline survey) andendlinet ¼ 0 otherwise.
In equation (5), 2d1 and 2d2 provide the ATE of IPs on control villages, and the
difference between IAR4D and conventional approaches, respectively.
Unobserved variables may drive the selection of conventional villages and
also be correlated with the outcome variable. Assuming that these unobserved
characteristics are constant and separable, the expected outcome variable can
be formulated as follows:
Yivt = ai + m endlinet + s1Controlv + s2Convv + d1(endlinet ×Controlv)
+ d2(endlinet×Convv) + b′Xit + u′Zvt + 1ivt.
(6)
To eliminate unobserved fixed effects, we first-difference (6) so that
DYiv1 = m+ d1Controlv + d2Convv + b′DXit + u′fDZvt + D1ivt. (7)
In what follows we will refer to this model as the first difference, or FD, model.
The DD and FD modelsare complementary approaches to dealing with potential
selection effects caused by the non-random selection of conventional villages.
Models (5) and (7) are estimated using OLS.7 In all estimations, we include
household and village characteristics summarised in Table 3. As the headcount
ratio indicator, land regulations and village resources variables are available at
the level of the village, we estimate models for those variables at the village
level, and take unweighted averages of relevant household variables to arrive
at village-level variables. Finally, since there may be correlation among house-
holds within villages, we cluster standard errors at the village level, and use
robust standard errors (i.e. models explaining FCSs).8
7 This means we use linear probability models to deal with binary outcomes, allowing ready com-
parison across specifications. Our specifications should be robust with respect to these commonly
used methodologies as most of the covariates are dummy variables. If we assume that treatment
heterogeneity is limited, regression estimations are close to the average effects (indeed, fitted
probabilities will be between 0 and 1 – see Section 5 for evidence on heterogeneity). However,
we have also estimated non-linear models and our qualitative results do not change much then
(even if for two of the innovation indicators different results emerge – estimates available on
request).
8 In theory, our estimates could be biased if alternative organisations implemented other interven-
tions systematically targeting IAR4D villages or comparison villages. We have kept track of other
interventions in IAR4D villages, and found this hardly occurred. We have no data on other projects
in comparison villages. If another organisation specifically targeted our comparison villages and
implemented a project that alleviated (enhanced) local poverty, then our DD and FD models will
underestimate (overestimate) the true impact of the IAR4D intervention.
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5.2 Tackling heterogeneity
While the average impact of conventional and IAR4D treatments in terms of
reduced poverty may be assessed using the above strategy, it ignores that the
returns to the treatment may vary across IPs, depending on local circumstances.
To probe into this issue, we analyse heterogeneity in impact. We take the entire
sample of control villages as the counterfactual for each IP (but obtain similar
results when using, instead, only control villages from the same country as
the IP in question as the counterfactual), and explore how impact varies for
the 12 IPs by using the following model:
DYivt = m+ d1Controlv + Sipu2ipIPip + b′DXit + u′DZvt + D1ivt, (8)
DYivt = m+ d2Controlv + Sipu1ipIPip + b′DXit + u′DZvt + D1ivt, (9)
where ip denotes each IP (ip ¼ 1, . . . , 12). IPip ¼ 1 if a household lives in an
IAR4D village. If IAR4D has an impact for a specific IP, then u1ip = 0. More-
over, if u2ip = 0, then this impact is different from the effect of the conventional
approach. Heterogeneity in terms of impact impliesu1ip = u1ip′ where ip = ip
′.
Heterogeneity might also materialise at the household, rather than the IP,
level. Not all households may be able to benefit from the proposed innovation
(e.g. because it does not meet their capabilities, skills, assets or desires).
Indeed, if IPs are hi-jacked to serve the interests of local elites, they could aggra-
vate local inequality. We therefore speculate that the impact of IAR4D might
vary with certain household characteristics. To examine whether this is true,
we estimate the following model, which is based on equation (7) but includes
interaction terms:
DYivt = m+ d31 IAR4Dv + w′(IARD4Dv × Fitk) + d2Convv + b′DXit
+ u′DZvt + D1ivt, (10)
DYiv = m+ d32IAR4Dv + w′(IARD4Dv × Fitk) + d2Controlv + b′DXit
+ u′DZvt + D1ivt, (11)
where IARD4Dv is a dummy variable equal to 1 for intervention/IAR4D vil-
lages, and Fit is a vector of characteristics (a relevant subset of Xi1, see
below). Parameters associated with the relevant interaction term, w, reveal
whether impact varies with different characteristics (note thatw from equations
(10) and (11) are equivalent). Parameters d31 and d32 indicate ATEs relative to
control and conventional villages, as before.
We interact four groups of variables with IARD4Dv. Three groups are candi-
dates for heterogeneous impact: (i) education (edu_secondary and edu_
univers), (ii) agricultural experience (duration) and (iii) access to finance
(borrowed_formal and borrowed_informal). The fourth variable for interacting
captures the baseline survey time (Surv_time). This interaction term has a differ-
ent interpretation, and allows us to tentatively explore whether the length of the
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intervention matters. By extension, this may be informative regarding the poten-
tial bias introduced by the fact that conventional villages have benefitted from
intervention for a longer time than the IAR4D villages. If the estimate of the
coefficient interaction term is jointly significant together with the estimated
coefficient for Surv_time then the impact of intervention varies with the
intervention length.
6. Estimation results for poverty indicators
We now turn to the regression results. In Table 5 we report ATEs of the IAR4D
approach in terms of poverty. We report regression outcomes for the DD and FD
model. For each model, the left column provides the estimated impact on control
villages, and the right column reports differences between IAR4D and conven-
tional extension. When estimating the models we included a full vector of
control variables (see Table 3), but do not report these coefficients to economise
on space.9
6.1 Intention to treat effects
We believe Table 5 contains the most important result of this paper. The IAR4D
intervention successfully reduced poverty, and is more effective than conven-
tional extension efforts in reducing poverty. Both the DD and FD models indi-
cate that, compared with the control group of ‘control villages’, the number of
people below the poverty line has fallen by some 17 per cent on average. Com-
paring IAR4D and conventional extension approaches produces a slightly
smaller impact (14 per cent fewer poor people), suggesting that the conven-
tional extension strategy hardly outperforms doing nothing. These are striking
results, in light of the fact that the IAR4D approach has been implemented for
just 2 years, so that we are only picking up short-term effects.
The positive signs for the food consumption indicator in row 2 provide (very)
weak support for the above conclusion. Note that the FCS coefficients are not
statistically significant from 0. This could indicate various possibilities.
Perhaps we measure food consumption with error (inflating standard errors),
or perhaps the poor prefer to spend part of their extra income on other items
than food. Or, alternatively, perhaps extra expenditures on food do not translate
into extra calories (but in better-tasting food, say, as argued by Banerjee and
Duflo, 2011). Subsequent results also suggest considerable heterogeneity
in terms of food consumption at the IP level, masking aggregate impact
(see below).
As mentioned above, these estimates may over- or underestimate the effect-
iveness of IPs. Note that, if there are diminishing (increasing) returns to
9 Due to missing observations for poverty indicators and control variables, the number of observa-
tions reported in Table 4 is lower than documented in Table 1. To test whether missing observa-
tions bias our results, we also estimated parsimonious models without control variables and
with limited sets of control variables (varying sample size). We conclude our results are robust.
To economise on space, we do not report those estimates, and they are available upon request.
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Table 5. Estimated impacts of intervention on poverty and food consumption
DD FD
IAR4D – Control IAR4D – Conventional IAR4D – Control IAR4D – Conventional
Headcount ratio 218.26*** (6.468) 212.96* (6.948) 217.13** (7.582) 214.25* (8.131)
[n ¼ 402] [n ¼ 163]
FCS 0.776 (0.662) 0.328 (0.619) 0.636 (0.652) 0.166 (0.605)
[n ¼ 3879] [n ¼ 1580]
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intervention, then the estimated 14 per cent difference between IAR4D and con-
ventional extension efforts according to the DD and FD model is an overesti-
mate (underestimate) of the true gap in effectiveness over the 2-year study
period. Regardless, since the headcount ratio in the IAR4D villages was
greater than in the conventional villages at the time of the baseline survey
(see Table 4), it appears as if the IAR4D villages have ‘caught up’.
6.2 Heterogeneity across IPs
In Table 6, we examine whether there are differences, in terms of impact on the
incidence of poverty, across IPs. We provide estimates for u1ip and u2ip from
equations (8) and (9), respectively, for each IP separately. For any IP, the first
row corresponds to the impact of IAR4D on the food consumption index and
the number of poor people. The second row shows how this estimated impact
compares to the impact of conventional extension efforts.
The results suggest considerable heterogeneity across IPs. Indeed, there are
(i) successful IPs where poverty went down (Bufundi, Chahi, Mudende and
Kituva), (ii) IPs where poverty appears unaffected, but also (iii) IPs where
poverty has increased after the implementation of IPs (Rubare). Hence, ATEs
mask large differences across platforms. Similar heterogeneity exists for our
food consumption measure. It is interesting to note that the most successful
IPs are the ones with high poverty rates at the baseline, suggesting a catching
up process. It is also interesting to note that successful platforms are scattered
across the study region, and not confined to one or two wards or countries
with specific characteristics: Bufindi and Chahi are located in different districts
in Uganda, Mudende is in Rwanda and Kituva is in the DRC. Hence, the results
are not driven by cultural and institutional factors limited to a specific locality.
However, and supporting the view that the impact of IPs varies with local
conditions, not all poor IPs have above-average growth. For example, Rubare
and Rumangabo are poor but not successful. Average poverty rates at the base-
line were 57 and 66 per cent, respectively, and poverty rates went up after the
intervention.
Note that the poverty and FCSs go hand-in-hand for several IPs (e.g. Bufundi,
Chahi, Kituva and Rubare). But for one IP (Mudende), our data suggest a (dra-
matic) decrease in poverty rates that is not accompanied by an increase in food
security scores. This is a puzzling result – perhaps reminiscent of results
reported for India by Deaton and Dreze (2009). As mentioned above, it may
reflect a near zero income elasticity for the food items included in the FCS
measure, but in light of the low baseline score, this may not be plausible.
Other candidate explanations exist. The estimated poverty impacts may be mis-
measured. Recall our poverty data are based on focus group discussions, so they
may be imprecise or open to manipulation. Alternatively, perhaps the poverty
impact is actually less dramatic than it appears – if the platform translates
into a small income gain for a large number of people just below the poverty
line, then the headcount ratio falls a lot without affecting consumption patterns
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of affected households a lot. In other words, a dramatic reduction in the poverty
headcount should not be confused with a dramatic increase in income.
Of course we are interested in exploring the determinants of IP performance.
However, we lack the data to analyse this in any level of detail (we have only 12
observations at the IP level), and believe this question is best addressed at the
programme level – pulling together data from the three sites (36 IPs in total).
A look at our data, however, suggests IP performance may vary with certain
key baseline community characteristics.10 For example, IP performance
varies with a few proxies of social capital. We find robust (partial) correlations
between IP success and whether community members make voluntary financial
contributions to support community activities or to remedy communal pro-
blems. Hence, pre-existing levels of social capital may be a factor explaining
the success or failure of IPs.




coefficients FCS Headcount ratio
Kayonza Q11 20.0799 _
a
Q21 20.497
Bubare Q12 20.229 26.087
Q22 20.646 23.417
Bufundi Q13 2.718*** 244.73***
Q23 2.301** 242.06**
Chahi Q14 3.486*** 230.21**
Q24 3.069*** 227.54*
Gataraga Q15 20.250 220.51
Q25 20.667 217.85
Remera Q16 3.784*** 9.299
Q26 3.367** 11.97
Rwerere Q17 1.533 29.552
Q27 1.116 26.883
Mudende Q18 20.117 238.35***
Q28 20.534 235.68**
Kituva Q19 3.747** 229.13**
Q29 3.330** 226.46*
Bweremana Q110 20.207 8.425
Q210 20.624 11.09
Rubare Q111 25.841*** 39.21***
Q211 26.258*** 41.88***
Rumangabo Q112 24.402*** 11.59
Q212 24.819*** 14.25
a Not available, because baseline headcount ratio data from Kayonza IP are missing.
10 To circumvent reverse causality concerns, we use pre-IP intervention baseline measures of
community characteristics in this analysis.
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While determining the exact mechanism linking innovations to poverty re-
duction is beyond the scope of the current paper, we emphasise this is an import-
ant area for follow-up work. Both the selection of innovations and the impact of
adoption of specific innovations appear to be context-specific.
6.3 Heterogeneity across households
Next, we examine whether the impact of IAR4D is conditional on household
characteristics – is a subset of villagers able to reap the benefits (if any),
while others cannot? In Table 7, we provide estimation results for models
(10-11). The two top rows for each group k give estimated values for d31 and
d32, respectively. The other rows present estimates of w. It is clear that there
is no evidence of heterogeneous impact. The impact of IAR4D does not vary
with household agricultural experience, access to finance or education. That
is, IAR4D benefits, if any, are shared within the community.
The only interaction term to enter significantly in Table 7 measures hetero-
geneity in time – this interaction term is the product of the IAR4D intervention
and the survey time dummy (significant at the 10 per cent level). The interaction
term suggests that IPs that have been in existence for 2 years outperform IPs that
have been in existence for only 1 year. All successful IPs started in 2008 (but not
all IPs starting in 2008 were successful). Specifically, the more established IPs
have on average a reduction in poverty of 20 per cent and the immature IPs see
the poverty rate go up by 5 per cent.
The latter result, however, should be taken with a pinch of salt, because
the nature of our poverty data may not permit strong statements about tiny
Table 7. Heterogeneous treatment effects
Dependent variables
Estimated impact FCS Poverty
IAR4D – Control 1.428 228.61
IAR4D – Conventional 0.956 225.88
IAR4D × Duration 20.0360 0.492
IAR4D – Control 0.757 227.93**
IAR4D – Conventional 0.287 224.45**
IAR4D × edu_secondary 20.494 38.98
IAR4D × edu_univer 0.799 214.69
IAR4D – Control 0.399 228.37
IAR4D – Conventional 20.0677 225.86
IAR4D × borrow_formal 1.673 69.27
IAR4D × borrow_informal 0.230 2.272
IAR4D – Control 0.492 220.33**
IAR4D – Conventional 0.0257 218.02**
IAR4D × survtime 0.677 25.70*
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(short-term) effects. Nevertheless, we speculate that any negative start-up
effects may capture the investment component of building an IP – there are
significant short-term (opportunity) costs and medium-term benefits will only
materialise after the IP is functioning. Such non-linearities in the response to
intervention effort may imply that we underestimate the impact of IAR4D rela-
tive to the conventional policy (where intervention started earlier, so that initial
investment costs have been borne before the experiment started).
7. Probing the mechanism: platforms and innovation
How does IAR4D lower poverty? As a first stab regress the adoption of our
innovation indicators on the IP treatment by using linear probability models
(i.e. we estimate equations (6) and (7) using innovation variables as dependent
variables). We ask whether there are significant differences in terms of adoption
between the three types of villages. Estimation results are given in Tables 8 and
9. We only report (differences in) coefficients of interest, but again these models
were estimated with a full vector of controls.11
The innovation impact, as summarised in Tables 8 and 9, is less pronounced
than the poverty impact summarised in Table 5. On average, IAR4D does not
have a robust and significant positive impact on the adopting of these innovations.
Instead, the DD and FD models suggest that IAR4D is associated with the
dis-adoption of certain technologies, such as the probability of using animal
manure or the use of certain post-harvest technologies (drying). A similar
picture emerges with respect to other innovation proxies, related with regulation,
marketing strategiesand village resources. According to Table 9, IAR4D does not
have a significant positive impact on the average probability of adoption.
However, these results should not be surprising, and do not discredit the in-
novation systems hypothesis. For instance, Pamuk et al. (2014) analyse the
impact of IAR4D on technology adoption for all PLSs (i.e. not just the Lake
Kivu PLS analysed in this paper), and show that priorities vary across IPs.
Indeed, the lack of significant ATEs in terms of adoption of specific innovations
is the natural outcome given that priority setting is decentralised. Since each IP
decides on its own priorities, reflecting local preferences, opportunities and con-
straints, each IP should settle on its own ‘innovations’ and ATEs are difficult to
detect.
For this reason, we also tested for heterogeneity in terms of the types of inno-
vations that are adopted. This implies estimating equations (10) and (11) and
using our innovation indicators as dependent variables. Detailed regression
results are many, and are not shown here to economise on space (but they are
available on request). Summarising the main insights, and consistent with
results by Pamuk et al. (2014), adoption priorities vary from one IP to
another. This is true both for the technical as well as the governance-related
innovations. For example, in Bubare conservation farming has significantly
11 The adoption of many technologies is frequently undertaken simultaneously (e.g. Dorfman, 1996).
This aspect of technology adoption is ignored in the modelling.
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Table 8. Estimated impact of intervention on agricultural technologies
Dependent variables
DD FD
Interv – Control Interv – Conv Interv – Control Interv – Conv
(2d1) (2d2) (2d1) (2d2)
Mulching 20.0528 (0.0472) 0.00842 (0.0465) 20.0310 (0.0476) 20.00697 (0.0461)
Trenches/terraces 20.0186 (0.0443) 0.0459 (0.0446) 0.00162 (0.0444) 0.0740* (0.0431)
Water harvesting 20.0107 (0.0400) 20.0280 (0.0375) 20.0209 (0.0461) 20.0416 (0.0421)
Irrigation 20.0229 (0.0284) 20.0163 (0.0286) 20.0242 (0.0306) 20.0162 (0.0300)
Conservation farming 20.00353 (0.0537) 20.0169 (0.0478) 20.0195 (0.0622) 20.00684 (0.0523)
Animal manure 20.103** (0.0472) 20.0778* (0.0426) 20.117** (0.0523) 20.0831* (0.0470)
Cover crops 0.0195 (0.0432) 0.00778 (0.0428) 20.00680 (0.0474) 20.00445 (0.0472)
Crop rotation 20.0474 (0.0430) 0.0361 (0.0385) 20.0462 (0.0444) 0.0388 (0.0407)
Inter cropping 20.0245 (0.0532) 20.0615 (0.0492) 20.0161 (0.0567) 20.0504 (0.0510)
Rhizobiainoculation 20.0150 (0.0155) 20.0113 (0.0150) 20.0254 (0.0173) 0.000283 (0.0150)
Chemical fertiliser 0.00326 (0.0298) 0.00767 (0.0301) 20.00561 (0.0305) 0.0189 (0.0318)
Row planting 0.0348 (0.0458) 0.0208 (0.0406) 0.0562 (0.0488) 0.0385 (0.0443)
Plant spacing 20.0281 (0.0540) 20.0160 (0.0529) 20.0166 (0.0580) 0.00418 (0.0546)
Organic pesticide 20.0355 (0.0322) 0.00329 (0.0334) 20.0162 (0.0325) 0.0143 (0.0339)
Inorganic pesticide 0.0264 (0.0352) 0.0177 (0.0387) 0.0383 (0.0365) 0.0172 (0.0416)
Drying 20.108** (0.0537) 20.0790 (0.0483) 20.0895* (0.0533) 20.0718 (0.0478)
Threshing/shelling equipment 20.0110 (0.0540) 0.0559 (0.0500) 0.00296 (0.0528) 0.0802 (0.0504)
Improved storage facilities 20.00540 (0.0486) 20.00798 (0.0423) 0.0167 (0.0497) 0.0131 (0.0431)
Pest control 0.0683 (0.0603) 0.0209 (0.0546) 0.0731 (0.0646) 0.0362 (0.0594)
Grading 20.0225 (0.0611) 20.00513 (0.0588) 20.0142 (0.0641) 20.00868 (0.0615)
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Table 9. Estimated impact of intervention on the probability of land regulations and marketing strategies and village resources
Dependent variables
DD FD
Interv – Control Interv – Conv Interv – Control Interv – Conv
(2d1) (2d2) (2d1) (2d2)
Land regulations
nrmbylaws 20.131 (0.0889) 20.107 (0.0874) 0.0108 (0.0708) 20.000929 (0.0712)
landlaws 20.0959 (0.0869) 20.127 (0.0933) 0.0511 (0.0796) 20.0213 (0.0798)
Marketing strategies
notsold 20.0674 (0.0602) 20.0585 (0.0601) 20.0575 (0.0612) 20.0685 (0.0629)
consumers 0.0384 (0.0339) 0.0611 (0.0378) 20.00995 (0.0374) 0.0547 (0.0380)
middleman 20.0274 (0.0351) 20.00650 (0.0350) 20.0389 (0.0365) 20.0160 (0.0362)
on road side 20.0205 (0.0297) 20.00927 (0.0288) 20.0102 (0.0332) 20.0279 (0.0301)
local market 20.00508 (0.0548) 0.00334 (0.0517) 20.0104 (0.0571) 0.0188 (0.0544)
district town 0.00468 (0.0203) 20.0125 (0.0203) 0.00439 (0.0217) 20.0121 (0.0224)
distant market 20.0477* (0.0252) 20.0366 (0.0267) 20.0449 (0.0293) 20.0274 (0.0313)
sold 20.0376 (0.0374) 20.0471 (0.0356) 20.0640* (0.0377) 20.0567 (0.0354)
Village resources
wells 0.0422 (0.0881) 0.0244 (0.0843) 0.0393 (0.0962) 0.0160 (0.0884)
veterinary 20.00523 (0.0749) 20.0640 (0.0656) 20.0285 (0.0764) 20.0969 (0.0690)
woodlots 0.0724 (0.108) 20.0374 (0.109) 0.108 (0.107) 20.0371 (0.110)
waterbody 20.0435 (0.115) 20.00289 (0.115) 20.0683 (0.125) 20.0776 (0.131)
wateringpoint 20.232** (0.0901) 20.131 (0.0863) 20.232** (0.0945) 20.138 (0.0888)
agriresearch 0.0928 (0.0594) 0.0211 (0.0598) 0.0203 (0.0615) 20.0471 (0.0595)
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increased while plant spacing and organic pesticide usage decreased. In Bwer-
emana mulching and row planting usage increased, and manure use decreased.
Similarly, in some IPs market integration has gone up, whereas in others it went
down. There does not appear to be a systematic pattern in terms of innovations
adopted by IPs.
We can focus on the choices made by the four IPs most successful from a
poverty alleviation perspective: Bufindi, Chahi, Mudende and Kituva. For
these IPs, adopted innovations appear predominantly institutional in nature.
Given the short-time frame after the intervention (2 years), this is perhaps not
unexpected. Insofar as it is easier to change institutions and governance arrange-
ments than to pioneer with technical innovations and upscale their use, we might
expect institutional reform to have impact relatively quickly. Key innovations in
successful IPs are enhanced market access (Chahi, Kituva), adoption of new land
regulations (Bufindi) and improved access to village resources (Mudende). Occa-
sionally these governance innovations were complemented with technical in-
novations (e.g. post-harvest pest control in Chahi, and mulching, irrigation, inter
cropping, row planting, organic pest and post-harvest management in Kituva).
While determining the exact mechanism linking innovations to poverty
reduction is beyond the scope of the current paper, we emphasise that this is
an important area for follow-up work. Both the selection of innovations and
the impact of adoption of specific innovations appear to be context-specific.
For example, while successful IPs have focused on developing marketing strat-
egies, changing access to land and the application of specific technologies, our
dataset also provides counter examples to these success stories. Bweremana
adopted the same technologies as Kituva, but in Bweremana this did not
result in a lower poverty rate. The match between local conditions and innova-
tions determines the success of an IP, but this will have to be explored more care-
fully (perhaps using qualitative methods).
8. Conclusions and discussion
Conventional extension efforts have by and large failed to generate the wide-
spread adoption of innovations that are considered necessary to advance the
agricultural development agenda. In response, the search is on for alternative
mechanisms that foster innovation, adoption and diffusion and alleviate
poverty. We report short-term evidence on the effectiveness of one such
initiative – decentralised and participatory innovation systems. As part of a
large experiment, so-called IPs have been introduced in a sample of selected
villages. The performance of these villages, in terms of poverty reduction, is
compared with the performance of two different counterfactual groups;
control villages and villages benefiting from traditional extension approaches.
Even though the period between baseline and follow-up survey was short,
extending to not .2 years, surprisingly we are able to document some impact
of IPs on poverty rates.
Our main conclusions are fourfold. First, we show positive ATEs of the
innovation system intervention. On average, IPs reduce poverty. Second, the
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participatory approach appears more effective than traditional extension efforts
in alleviating poverty. Third, the positive impact of the intervention is not
limited to local elites. Instead, the impact does not vary (much) with household
characteristics. Fourth, and reflecting the decentralised nature of the innovation
systems approach, different platforms prioritise different types of innovations.
We speculate that this diversity reflects variation in local opportunities and con-
straints. Next steps in our research agenda on innovation systems are (i) to
analyse the mechanism linking IPs to poverty reduction (the adoption of specific
innovations – see Pamuk et al. (2014), who document that the participatory
model promotes the adoption of crop management innovations, but find no sig-
nificant effects for other types of innovation) and (ii) to systematically compare
the costs and benefits of IAR4D and alternative approaches to innovation and
diffusion.
Two caveats should be mentioned. First, we did not implement an RCT where
villages are randomly assigned to either the IAR4D treatment, or to one of the
two counterfactual groups. We aim to control for potential selection bias by es-
timating DD models and panel models, but cannot completely rule out that some
estimation bias eventuates due to unobservable and time-varying factors.
Second, we obtain the most interesting results for our poverty data, which are
not based on detailed household measurements but reflect the outcome of
focus group discussions of local village leaders. The reduction in poverty for
some villages is dramatic, and is not consistently matched by improvements
in our measure of food consumption. This could point to an interesting empirical
puzzle, inviting follow-up analysis or could point to mis-measurement of local
poverty rates. Perhaps the focus group approach to data collection did not
produce precise measures of local poverty, or perhaps it resulted in biased
assessments. For example, the enhanced social interaction associated with the
IP treatment could affect the outcomes of the poverty assessment (as both are
inherently social processes). Alternatively, ‘local leaders’ may have strategic
reasons to misrepresent local poverty rates. However, it is not evident (to us)
whether they should over- or under-represent such rates. If they do not want
to disappoint the researchers, village leaders in IAR4D villages may under-
represent poverty rates during the endline. But if the aim is to attract additional
funding and projects, then perhaps poverty rates are over-estimated (sending a
signal of urgency). Hence, and also in light of the observation that poverty rates
were not balanced during the baseline, we emphasise the importance of efforts to
verify our findings in other contexts, perhaps using alternative proxies for
poverty and (food) consumption.12
Notwithstanding these important caveats, the evidence suggests that decentra-
lised innovation systems, based on participation of a wide range of stakeholders,
12 Note that our results may also beexplained bynon-random selection of IP sites for additional inter-
ventions. However, there is no evidence of ‘other interventions’ systematically benefitting the vil-
lages selected for IAR4D. We have not kept track of all ‘other interventions’ in comparison areas, so
we cannot rule out that another intervention targeted non-intervention sites and had negative
impacts on poverty alleviation there (explaining the positive estimated impacts in our study).
However, we believe this to be unlikely.
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may represent a promising vehicle to promote agricultural development. It pro-
vides tentative support for the recent transition to ‘new demand-led approaches to
extension’ identified by theWorldBank(WorldBank,2007).However,othercon-
siderations are relevant and should be mentioned here. First, while the IP approach
on average generates positive impacts, there are also platforms that apparently
have failed to generate any short-term benefits. It is clearly a first-order priority
to analyse and explain the variation in performance. Does short-term success
dependonthenatureof theplatformimplementationprocess – anecdotalevidence
suggests that there has been variation in the way that these platforms have been
initiated and governed – or does it depend on characteristics of the affected com-
munities (e.g. pre-existing levels of social capital)? Or is it simply true that in some
platforms a consensus was reached to focus on innovations that pay off in the
longer term, so that lack of a short-term effect is not indicative of platform
failure at all? Follow-up research is needed to analyse this issue. Our preliminary
analysis of the data suggests that the nature of the innovations selected and adopted
varies across IPs – as is to be expected with a decentralised innovation approach.
Second, decentralising priority setting in the domain of innovation involves a
trade-off. While decentralised approaches, such as IAR4D, allow tapping into
pools of local knowledge and understanding, it might imply foregoing potential
economies of scale in R&D. A particularly bad outcome – not one that is con-
sistent with our data – would be where many platforms are inventing the same
wheel. Moreover, a decentralised approach might induce a focus on bottlenecks
that can be addressed locally. The macro-perspective, involving large-scale
investments in physical infrastructure or national, sectoral or trade policies,
might be overlooked. It appears important to give more space and attention to
the use of the decentralised approach to innovation, while engaging policy-
makers of the ‘right level’ as well. The challenge will be to find the right
balance between centralised and decentralised efforts to get African agriculture
going.
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